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P r o f .  R y s z a r d  M . M a f a j n y
Fa c u l t y  o f  L a w  a n d  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , U n i v e r s i t y  o f  S i l e s i a
SOME TERMINOLOGICAL CONTROVERSIES 
CONCERNING THE MAXIM 
OF DIVISION OF POWER
I. INTRODUCTION
The rule of division of power belongs to a few fundamental maxims of democrat­
ic government but, paradoxically, it is probably the most vague one. In the literature 
of the subject some major terminological divergencies come to the fore, accompa­
nied by the differences of opinion concerning some substantial issues affecting the 
mentioned precep.1 It needs then to construct its general definition -  so as to iden­
tify properly the relative maxims -  to clarify its basic terms, and to discern some lev­
els within which it can be analyzed. For there are almost as many interpretations of 
the principle of distribution of power as the authors who examine it. In view of this, 
some terminological considerations, even condensed ones, are indispensable.
II. THE LEVELS OF DIVISION OF POWER
The adversaries of the idea of distribution of power -  and not only they -  empha­
size correctly that the term ’’division of power” pertains to one of the most unclear 
notions in the constitutional vocabulary, and as such it is used in various meanings. 
This designation may be construed in different ways, indeed, and analyzed on many 
research levels, aspects, manifestations, or dimensions. Even the authors of the ancient 
governmental views took into account the multiplicity of the state organs and certain 
distinction of powers between them. This distribution, as a considerably complicat­
ed phenomenon, was carried out by virtue of various criteria and by the application 
of manifold cognitive methods. Reaching out for the criterion of a branch of knowl­
edge, the phenomenon in which we are interested can be examined on the legal and 
socio-politicial level. The first affects the problem of distribution of the legal spheres 
of state activity among the suitable state organs or their groups, as well as the mutual 
relationships between these organs. The second one concerns the issue of a degree of 
the influence of the social subjects of power exerted upon the process o f decision­
making within the state apparatus. Into the play come here both the organized (po­
1 See e.g., A. Pullo, »Podzial wladzy«. Aktualne problemy w doktrynie, prawie i wspolczesnej dyskusji 
konstytucyjnej w Polsce, „Przegl^d Sejmowy” 1993, No. 3, p. 9, 14; W. Sokolewicz, Podzial wladz - idea pol- 
ityczna czy zasada prawna? Z dylematow wspolczesnego ustrojodawcy, w: Prawo w okresie przemian ustro- 
jowych w Polsce, Warszawa 1995, p. 19; R. R. Ludwikowski, Aspekty prawne ostatnich wyborow prezydenc- 
kich w Stanach Zjednoczonych, „Panstwo i Prawo” 2001, No. 4, p. 36, 37.
litical parties, interest groups, trade unions, denominations, and social organizations) 
and unorganized subjects (social classes, strata, and groups). In other words, division 
of the state power may be considered on the following levels (planes):
A. A legal (functio-organizational) level -  i.e., a functional individuation of the 
particular legal spheres of state activity and accomplishment o f the correspondent 
organizational distribution of this government into the particular organs.
B. A socio-political level -  i.e., a lack of social and political identity o f the pow­
er subjects with the state apparatus or an identification of the specified social class­
es and groups with the particular organs.
This classification is of leading character, therefore, any other typologies will be 
of complementary nature. So, within the legal level division of power may be exam­
ined in the aspects named below:
A.
I. A formal aspect -  i.e., a distribution of the state power under the provisions of
law.
II. A substantial aspect -  i.e., a distribution of the state power in fact.
B.
I. An objective aspect -  i.e., a functional individuation of the particular legal spheres
of state activity.
II. A subjective aspect -  i.e., an organizational distribution of the state apparatus into
the particular state organs according to the previously accomplished function­
al division of power.
C.
I. A horizontal aspect -  i.e., a distribution of powers between the correspondent state
organs of the same hierarchical level.
II. A vertical aspect -  i.e., a distribution of powers between the organs o f central (in­
cluding federal) and territorial level (including the organs o f the members of 
federation).
D.
I. An external aspect -  i.e., a division of powers between the particular groups of
organs.
II. An internal aspect -  i.e., a division of powers within the particular groups of or­
gans.
It is worth emphasizing that most authors mainly name two antithetical aspects of 
division of power -  in which they are most interested -  and use various designations 
for them. Beyond that, a rational classification of the foregoing aspects can hardly be 
met.2 The constitutionalists primarily deal with the legal aspect of the above prin­
ciple and less with the socio-political one. Yet, within the sphere o f the former they 
prefer the following aspects: formal, objective, subjective, and horizontal.
2 These solely are the most often applied qualifications, since in the French constitutionalism we still 
meet in this context such terms like division, distinction, distribution, repartition, and specialisation; and 
in the German constitutionalism respectively Verteilung, Scheidung, Unterscheidung, and Sonderung.
III. THE ADEQUATE NOMENCLATURE
The issue that also requires determination is the correctness of terminology. In the 
Polish literature the notion ’’division of power” is accompanied by the term ’’division 
of powers”, that being often identified with the first one. In the French literature the 
denomination ’ separation of powers” (separation des pouvoirs) is used, while in the 
German one the two notions function parallely: ’division of powers” (Gewaltenteilung) 
and ’’separation of powers” (Gewaltentrennung)3. In the Anglo-Saxon literature, in­
stead, the name ’’separation of powers” occurs the most frequently but alongside such 
designations appear as ’’distribution”, ’’division”, ’’distinction”, ’’partition”, ’’differentia­
tion”, ’’isolation”, ’ dispersion”, ’ diffusion”, ’ fragmentation”, and even ’ separated and di­
vided powers”.4 All these names are inadequate, save the first four: e.g., the last one is 
clearly inconsequent. In my belief, there is an essential difference between the terms 
’ division of power” and ’ division of powers”. I am inclined to construe division (dis­
tribution) of the state power as a functional (objective) individuation of the particu­
lar spheres of activity of the state apparatus. In the first place, at issue here is a factual 
distribution of the areas o f activity o f the particular organs, apprehended as a divi­
sion of tasks. As regards division of powers, it denotes an organizational (subjective) 
individuation of the particular state organs corresponding to the previously accom­
plished distribution of power. From the logical viewpoint division of power (i.e., its 
functio-objective aspect) must be of original character, while division of powers (i.e., 
its organizatio-subjective aspect) ought to be o f secondary nature.
Interchangeably operating of the designations ’ division of power” and ’’separation 
of powers” is utterly misleading, because separation in contrast with division does 
not observe links between the organs.5 Lacking such links an efficient exercise of the
3 See G. Marshall, Constitutional Theory, Oxford 1980 (1971), pp. 97-100; J. P. Roche, Distribution of 
Powers, in: International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, New York-London 1968, Vol. 3-4, pp. 300 
ff.; D. Waldo, The Administrative State. A Study of the Political Theory of American Public Administra­
tion, New York 1948, p. 107; L. H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, Mineola, N.Y. 1978, p. 15; A. Mass, 
op.cit., pp. 9 ff.
4 Therefore, I do not share A. N. Wroblewski’s view (Dwie interpretacje Monteskiusza, „Panstwo 
i Prawo” 1977, No. 12, pp. 59, 60) that ’’there is a fairly essential difference between a division o f pow­
ers and a distribution of powers. Division o f powers is a method of building and functioning of public 
power that provides for rather wide mutual links between its elements in the normal process of imple­
menting the particular formal functions. True, a distribution of powers is a similar method, however, 
it only permits some specific intervenient activities in certain situations; there is a lack o f the premis­
es o f steady cooperation here. Hence, as a rule, a distribution of power provides for a more independ­
ent action”. In my opinion, however, a different scope of links between the particular organs in various 
political systems obviously cannot be denied. Nonetheless, the distinction made by the author cannot 
be subsisted, either. From the semantic standpoint the notions ’ division” and ’ distribution” are syno­
nyms (see Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language, Springfield, Mass. 1981, 
pp. 660, 664), used solely in different contexts. Moreover, what the author calls ’distribution o f powers’  
amounts in essence to their separation. Thus, the identification by A. Pullo (O jedno rozumieniepodzialu 
wladz w nauce prawa konstytucyjnego, „Panstwo i Prawo” 1983, No. 6, pp. 35, 36, 45) of the names ”dis- 
tribution” and ”separation” in the context of the state power, as well as the conviction that the qualifi­
cation ”division of power” is erroneous, may by no means be accepted.
5 See C. L. de Montesquieu, O duchu praw, Warszawa 1957, Vol. I, p. 245; L. Lange, Teilung und Tren- 
nung der Gewalten bei Montesquieu, „Der Staat” 1980, No. 2, pp. 221, 229; W. Zamkowski, Monteskius- 
zowska koncepcja podzialu a socjalistyczna zasada jednosci wladzy panstwowej, „Zeszyty Naukowe Un-
state power is impossible. Thus, employing the term ’separation” in the context of the 
state power I find purposeless, apart from the fact that neither state has ever carried 
out a genuine separation of organs. It is noteworthy that de Montesquieu -  and lat­
er in. al., Hans Kelsen -  had unequivocally declared for distribution of powers (dis­
tribution des pouvoirs) and against their separation (separation), thereby equipping 
his conception with the system of checks which extorts cooperation of the partic­
ular state organs.6 This system precludes a limine any separation of organs. Hence 
the opinions -  met in the literature from time to time -  that separation of powers is 
a ”pure” or strict division of power,7 are logical but impracticable; whereas, practice 
is the best criterion to evaluate theory.
Returning to the controversy stemming from the problem of correctness o f the 
nomenclature -  viz., which name is more proper: ’’division of power” or ’’division of 
powers” -  I deem that the first one. This appraisal has also been inspired by the fact 
that the word ”power” (being very multivocal) used in the second term, is imprecise­
ly applied to designate a state organ or a group of organs. In consequence of that the 
notion ”division of powers” is simply obsolete today. Therefore, while applying the 
designation ’’division (or distribution) o f power”, I will use it in its broader meaning, 
unless a reservation is made that merely the subjective aspect is involved. True, one 
could reach out for the denomination ”division of power and powers”, but it is not 
very handy. Some theoreticians suggest to resign from the name ’’division of power” 
and to replace it with a frequently used notion ’division of functions”. A few of them 
motivate their position by resorting to the ostensible contradiction between the rule 
of distribution of power and the principle of sovereignty (in. al., M. Duguit). The oth­
er ones (in. al., H. Kelsen and G. Jellinek), while not sharing this view, advances the 
thesis that the term ”division of functions” is more appropriate since the state pow­
er is by definition homogeneous and indivisible. For instance, writes Georg Jellinek: 
”Each state organ represents the state power within its competences. So, only distri­
bution of competences is possible, not distribution of power. In the multiplicity of 
its organs the state power is one and single”.8
The foregoing dilemma is exceptionally complex and its solid resolution would 
require a distinct dissertation. Addressing to it briefly, it should be indicated that it 
is being solved in a variety o f ways. The most common of them consists in dividing 
the legislative power (gesetzgebende Gewalt) away from the power of creating a polit-
iwersytetu Wroclawskiego” 1958, p. 25-27; H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, New York 1973 
(1945), pp. 272, 273; Z. Rykowski, W. Sokolewicz, Zagadnienie podzialu wladz w Austrii, „Panstwo i Prawo” 
1983, No. 12, p. 87.
6 U. Lange, op.cit., pp. 213, 214 and the literature quoted there; R. K. Gooch, Modern French Views 
on the Doctrine of the Separation of Powers, ’ Political Science Quarterly” 1923, Part 1, Vol. 38, No. 4, pp. 
588, 589.
7 G. Jellinek, Ogolna nauka o panstwie, Warszawa 1921, pp. 360-362; H. Kelsen, op.cit., p. 255; W. 
Zamkowski, op.cit., pp. 25, 26; Z. Rykowski, W. Sokolewicz, op.cit., p. 41; K. Loewenstein, Verfassungsle- 
hre, Tubingen 1969 (1957), pp. 32, 33. Following the same assumption, W Lang (see Monteskiusz i jego 
dzielo, Wroclaw 1956, p. 235) arrived at the equally controversial conclusion that it can merely be told 
about a ”division of powers” -  otherwise, about their distribution -  but not about a ”division of power” 
since this last designation implies a division o f sovereign power.
8 See Z. Rykowski, W Sokolewicz, op.cit., pp. 79, 80, 85; I. Bibo, Podzial wladzpanstwowych dawniej 
i dzis, „Znak” 1982, No. 10, p. 1239; M. Sobolewski, Zasady demokracji burzuazyjnej i ich zastosowanie, 
Warszawa 1969, pp. 18 ff.
ical system (verfassunggebende Gewalt), otherwise, an ordinary legislator away from 
a constitutional legislator. The latter is endowed with the right o f ”broader” exer­
cise o f the people’s sovereignty and thereby is being placed above division of power. 
At the same time, a constitutional tribunal is granted the role o f a guarantor o f the 
supremacy of a constitution, including the precept o f distribution. The other ana­
lysts lay the greatest stress on the sociological and legal levels o f the problem, hold­
ing that if a nation is the possessor of sovereignty and the exercise of the latter per­
tains to the representative organs, the foundation of division of power within the 
state apparatus ought to be distribution of power within a nation itself.9 Let us also 
take into consideration that in their opinion the principle of division is inconsistent 
solely with the internal aspect of the rule o f sovereignty (i.e., supremacy), not with 
the external one (i.e., independence). That makes this issue easier.
I am convinced that the discrepancy between these two precepts is only apparent. 
The notions ’ sovereign power” and the ”state power” are not identical. Sovereignty 
is not a whole power in the state but merely a supreme, unlimited, and incessant au­
thority. Sovereign power is exclusively vested in a nation, yet, the state power is con­
ferred by a nation upon the state organs. These organs implement solely the attributes 
of sovereignty in the course o f a specified term, and may cease to be the depositar­
ies of the sovereign rights of a nation when their term comes to an end. The state or­
gans should be bound by a constitution, being ratified and altered by a referendum. 
Division of power, or an organizational individuation of the organs and distribu­
tion of powers between them, is indispensable to an effective exercise of the whole 
state power. The words of G. Jellinek, quoted hereinbefore, sound emphatic but do 
not convince since he had in mind not the state power, but a sovereign one. In a ra­
tionally organized state power ought to be dialectically treated, i.e., as being simul­
taneously divided and united. It is to be exercised by the state apparatus -  built on 
the ground of equality of all the supreme organs or of domination of one of them - 
which implements the interests o f a nation (sovereign). Therefore, I can see neither 
theoretical nor practical antinomy between the principle o f sovereignty and that of 
distribution of power.
Small wonder that the term ”state function” -  conceived most generally as a prime 
direction of the governmental activity -  is much more clear than the notion ”state 
power”. Nonetheless, as meet with various definitions o f the first designation, we en­
counter different classifications o f the state functions. A few examples. G. A. Almond 
and J. S. Coleman name four ”input” functions, i.e., political socialization and recruit­
ment, interest articulation, interest aggregation, and political communication; as well 
as three ’’output” functions, i.e., the rule-making, the rule-application, and the rule- 
adjudication.10 An interesting typology presents K. Loewenstein, who distinguish­
es policy determination, policy execution, and policy control.11 M. Sobolewski, in 
turn, proposes a ’’double level” systematization of the state functions: protection of
9 G. A. Almond, J. S. Coleman (eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas, Princeton 1960, p. 17.
10 K. Loewenstein, op.cit., p. 40.
11 M. Sobolewski, O funkcjach panstwa, „Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellonskiego (Prace z Nauk 
Politycznych)” 1971, No. 1, p. 13.
the class rule and the overall social function; internal and external.12 In older liter­
ature W F. Willoughby tried to justify the specification of five functions: executive, 
legislative, judicial, administrative, and the electoral one.13 However, any of the afore­
said sets o f functions embraced within the frame of the rule o f division of power 
can hardly be imagined. In practice more than once they overlap to a much great­
er measure than traditional legislation, execution, and jurisdiction, which a distinc­
tion is still celebrated by constitutionalism. As to the first two typologies, with the 
legal aspect of the governmental tasks they are associated to a small degree. Strict­
ly speaking, division of the state functions -  in a sense since the more proper term 
here would be the ’’legal spheres of state activity” -  constitutes only the objective part 
of distribution of power; yet any elaborated conception of the principle of division 
is consisted of the subjective and socio-political aspect and, by rights, the system of 
checks. In conclusion, it may truly be said that operating of the term ’distribution of 
functions” in the context of the state power would be misleading. It is for these sub­
stantial motives that I do not use this designation; not because it cannot adequately 
play the part o f a watchword for all the problems discussed here. The usefulness of 
the notion ’’distribution of labor between the state organs”14 -  to which some authors 
strive to reduce the crux of the precept of division of power -  looks alike.
IV. THE LEGAL SPHERES OF STATE ACTIVITY
The consecutive issue of the terminological nature that requires addressing at the 
beginning, is the question of defining three traditional legal spheres of state activi­
ty -  legislative, executive, and judicial. For if we are to examine the division of pow­
er in any state, then wishing to ascertain whether the powers possessed by these 
organs actually belong to the spheres assigned to them, we have to fathom the sub­
stance of these spheres first. However, the formulation of appropriate definitions, 
even the most general ones, is not easy inasmuch as the names: ’ legislation”, ’’exe­
cution”, and ’’jurisdiction” are extremely difficult to determine, more insistently the 
second one. The boundaries between them are not subject to a precise delimitation. 
Beyond that, it is doubtful whether any o f those spheres contains the same, invaria­
ble content irrespective of an epoch and country. The multiplicity of the state organs 
coming forward today, may reach such a phase in the future that any attempt to ac­
12 See D. Waldo, op.cit., p. 111; H. Kelsen, op.cit., p. 255, 256; G. Jellinek, op.cit., p. 458; Sir W. I. Jen­
nings, The Law and the Constitution, London 1960, p. 280; M. J. C. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Sep­
aration of Powers, Oxford 1969 (1967), pp. 277-279; J. A. Fairlie, The Separation of Powers, "Michigan 
Law Review” 1923, Vol. 21, pp. 419-423, 429-431; R. C. Moulton, Separation of Powers, Mixed Govern­
ment, and the Constitution, Chicago 1981 (an unpublished doctoral dissertation -  dis. the University of 
Chicago Library), pp. 353, 354.
13 T. Tsatsos occupies a similar position, writing that this qualification can serve at most as an ad­
dendum of the name ’division of power” -  idem, Zur Geschichte und Kritik der Lehre von der Gewalten- 
teilung, Heidelberg 1968, pp. 94, 95.
14 M. J. C. Vile, op.cit., p. 318; R. C. Moulton, op.cit., p. 199, 382 ff.; Sir W. I. Jennings, op.cit., p. 293, 303; 
G. Marshall, op.cit., p. 124; W. Zamkowski, Jednosc i podzial wladzy w Polsce Ludowej, „Zeszyty Naukowe 
Uniwersytetu Wroclawskiego”, Warszawa-Wroclaw 1961, p. 52; O. W. Kagi, Zur Entstehung, Wandlung 
und Problematik des Gewaltenteilungsprinzipes. Ein Beitrag zur Verfassungsgeschichte und Verfassungsle- 
hre, Zurich 1937, p. 240.
complish a reasonable classification of spheres will prove futile. It is this reason that 
dictates some analysts to distinguish the so-called interfunctions (Zwischenfunktio- 
nen), e.g., the quasi-judicial one, ect.15 There are also many definitions o f the legal 
spheres o f state activity16 which often contradict each other. Whereas this matter is 
highly complicated and would require an extensive and thorough analysis -  which 
is prevented by the capacity of this study -  I propose to accept the working formu­
las instead of carefully balanced designations of the particular spheres. Thus, legis­
lation is the governmental activity consisting in making general and abstract legal 
norms. Administration is the governmental activity o f an executive and managing 
character -  based upon statutory acts -  which amounts to the organizing of the life 
of a country and to the protection of civil rights and liberties. Jurisdiction is the gov­
ernmental activity aimed at interpreting the law and at trying conflicts which stem 
from the legal relationships.
Simultaneously, it is worth taking note of the distinction between formal and ma­
terial legal spheres of state activity, originated by F. Schmitthenner and grounded 
by the German scholars. The material (objective) spheres are the main directions 
of the governmental activity -  otherwise, legislation, administration, and jurisdic­
tion -  being understood in accordance with the above formulas. The formal (subjec­
tive) spheres are the complex o f legal spheres o f state activity of the particular gov­
ernmental organs which implement the material spheres.17 Stated another way, the 
material spheres derive their nature from their substance, while the formal ones de­
pend on a way of distribution of powers between the particular organs. To exem­
plify, administration in the material aspect is an activity o f par excellence executive- 
managing character. In the formal aspect, in turn, it means not only management 
but also issuing legal acts that specify statutes; in many countries trying minor of­
fenses as well. This distinction will be helpful in tracing the delimitation of powers 
between any state organs. And it will be proven that the form not always fits tightly 
to the corresponding substance.
V. THREE THEORIES OF DIVIDED POWER
Unfortunately, the terminological problems do not come to an end with the issues 
that have been previously discussed. With the passing of time the sense o f the desig­
nations: ’’legislative”, ’’executive”, and ’’judicial” underwent major changes. Moreover, 
not insignificant here are serious difficulties so often encountered by everyone who 
wishes to ascertain the origins o f a given political theory. Many of them, including 
the theory of division of power, represent the product o f a long evolution. The said
15 See in. al., G. Jellinek, op.cit., p. 469; H. Kelsen, op.cit., pp. 255-258; O. W. Kagi, op.cit., p. 159-161; 
R. C. Moulton, op.cit., pp. 385, 386; F. Green, Separation of Governmental Powers, in: Selected Essays on 
Constitutional Law, Vol. 4, Chicago 1938, pp. 199 ff.
16 See O. W. Kagi, op.cit., p. 117-119, 158-163; G. Jellinek, op.cit., pp. 463-481; Sir W. I. Jennings, op.cit., 
pp. 25, 282; M. J. C. Vile, op.cit., p. 285; R. C. Moulton, op.cit., p. 404; A. Pullo, op.cit., p. 31; H. Petzold, 
Die Gewaltenteilung in der europaischen Gemeinschaften, Gottingen 1966, pp. 27, 28. The contributors to 
the work edited by A. Maass apply the designation ’ separation of processes” -  see A. Maass (ed.), op.cit., 
pp. 10-15.
17 For further reading see R. M. Malajny, Trzy teorie podzielonej wladzy, Warszawa 2001.
theory was born in the seventeenth century on the grounds o f the antique theory 
of mixed government. The latter has been modified during the turn of the seven­
teenth and eighteenth centuries, assuming the name of the theory of balanced gov­
ernment.18 Within the ancient political thought also the doctrine of checks came into 
sight, which later became the component of all the three aforementioned theories. 
There is no agreement among the competent examiners as to their primary elements 
as well as to their mutual relationship. Therefore, wishing to spin even condensed de­
liberations we have to more precisely outline the criteria distinguishing those theo­
ries. This can be done in the easiest way by formulating pertinent definitions.
Nevertheless, the most easy does not necessarily mean easy. Those theories were 
elaborated and discussed in the writings of particular thinkers and commentators 
upon the levels of different degrees of abstraction. Furthermore, within the theory 
of distribution of power at least a dozen doctrines may be discerned. To illustrate, 
solely against the background of the political thought of the English Revolution, W.
B. Gwyn individuated five variants of the theory of division depending on the goals 
set for it.19 In reference to the piling up complications symptomatic is, among oth­
ers, the multivocality o f the notion ”power”, most often met in the literature o f the 
subject. According to the context, it can equally stand for a set o f legal relationships 
based upon superiority and subordination -  in the present study this name will be 
exclusively used in this sense -  as for the state organ, their group or a legal sphere of 
state activity. Similar troubles arise in connection with the term "government” which 
has numerous meanings.20 This author applies it most frequently as a synonym of 
the notion a ”top administrative organ” (Regierung); from time to time also as ”po- 
litical system” (Verfassung) and seldom as a "state apparatus”. The only solution is to 
rely upon the definitions of the theories mentioned above, even if they were to have 
an arbitrary character. Nonetheless, if these definitions are supposed to be a base for 
further considerations, not merely a starting point, on the one hand, they cannot be 
so narrow as to embrace only one of the doctrines pertaining to a specified theory, 
and on the other, so broad as to make those theories overlap.
It can summarily be said that the theory of division of power denotes a functional 
individuation of the particular spheres of state activity and the correspondent organ­
izational distribution of the government into particular organs; these organs should 
be relatively equal and independent, and ought to have a rather small opportunity 
to interfere with the activity of each other. The theory of mixed government means 
a combination of the three forms of government -  monarchy, aristocracy, and de­
mocracy -  where in order to preserve the socio-political balance the state power is 
distributed between a monarch, the nobles, and the people, while the particular state 
organs mutually participate in the exercise of their functions. The theory of balanced 
government designates an aggregation of the theory of division of power and that 
of mixed government, relying upon the combination of the three forms of govern­
ment -  monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy -  where in order to preserve the so-
18 W. B. Gwyn, The Meaning of the Separation of Powers. An Analysis of the Doctrine from Its Origin to 
the Adoption of the United States Constitution, New Orleans-The Hague 1965, pp. 37-65, 127, 128.
19 See Webster’s . . . , pp. 982, 983; C. H. Wilson, The Separation of Powers Under Democracy and Fascism, 
"Political Science Quarterly” 1937, Vol. 52, No. 4, p. 481.
20 See W B. Gwyn, op.cit., pp. 26, 27.
cio-political balance the state power (particularly the legislative function) is distrib­
uted between a monarch, the nobles, and the people, together with the simultaneous 
partial implementation of division of power and the establishment o f the system of 
checks. The doctrine of governmental checks consists in a partial distribution of the 
legal spheres of state activity within the shared power, enabling each state organ to 
exercise direct control over the others by means of the appropriate constitutional in­
struments, which results in the mutual checking of the organs; that implicates a rel­
ative balance between them.
The acceptance of the foregoing definitions will make much easier to cope with 
many research problems, for example, to trace the genesis o f the theory of division 
of power. Although, this is not to say that all the related difficulties disappear. It may 
be observed even prima facie that there are many tangent points, both logically and 
historically. No governmental mechanism can properly function only by virtue of 
a pure distribution of power. Therefore, it must be supplemented with the system of 
checks. All the three theories have a common starting point which is a drive to se­
cure freedom of an individual in the law-observing state. However, this drive is ac­
centuated with different force. Some thinkers have formulated their views in such 
a way that it is very hard to find which of the theories considered they compromise. 
On the other hand, the differences that split them cannot be overlooked.21 The most 
important of these amounts to the fact that while the theory of division of power is 
focused on distribution of the legal spheres o f state activity, the theories o f mixed 
and balanced government have been built on the grounds o f division of the state 
power among the social estates (classes). Thus, the first theory possesses primarily 
the functio-organizational overtone, while the two remaining ones have that o f the 
socio-political (class).
According to the unanimous conviction of the experts o f this problem, the origi­
nal source of the theories o f division of power and of balanced government, as well 
as the doctrine of checks, was the theory of mixed government.22 This statement con­
fines the area of understanding between the researchers. However, at the same time 
it widely opens the gate o f controversy as to the other issues. We meet them not only 
with the differential attempts to closely define the said theories, but also with their 
various names. It is not too much to say that we have here a true notional chaos. 
In the terminological circulation alongside of the designation ”mixed government” 
such names occur as ’mixed constitution” (Mischverfassung), ’ mixed monarchy” (ge- 
mischte Monarchie), ”mixed state” (status mixtus), etc. The term ’’balanced govern­
ment” is accompanied by the notion ’’balanced constitution” or even by the designa­
tion ’’limited government”. The term ’’system of checks”, in turn, is commonly used 
in the shape of ’’checks and balance” system, though, this name likewise universally 
appears in plural ("checks and balances”)23 which is improper since the substance of
21 M. J. C. Vile, op.cit., pp. 34-37; R. C. Moulton, op.cit., pp. 34, 105; C. J. Friedrich, Separation of Pow­
ers, in: Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, New York 1937, p. 663; idem, Constitutional Government and 
Democracy, Boston 1950, p. 174; G. W  Carey, The Separation of Powers, in: G. J. and S. G. Graham (eds.), 
Founding Principles of American Government. Two Hundred Years of Democracy on Trial, Bloomington- 
London 1977, p. 102.
22 See e.g., H. L. McBain, The Living Constitution, New York 1941, p. 150.
23 R. C. Moulton, op.cit., pp. 109, 110; M. J. C. Vile, op.cit., p. 18; K. von Fritz, The Theory of Mixed Con­
stitution in Antiquity. A Critical Analysis of Polybius’ Political Ideas, New York 1954, pp. 78, 184, 186.
this system is to attain a global balance between all the organs, not only some frac­
tional counterpoises. The sole adequate denomination in this context is the notion 
”system of checks”, because it is understood that it is just the checks that are to se­
cure the coveted balance, while the designation ”checks and balance” system implies 
an opposition between balance and checks.
The attitude of the constitutionalists toward the relation between the system of 
checks and the rule of division of power is uneven as well. Some treat this system 
as a distinct governmental doctrine, yet, others look on it as an integral element of 
the mentioned precept. The first view is justified historically, the second logically. 
The doctrine of checks has been elaborated for the first time by Polybius against the 
background of the theory of mixed government, and was consequently being evolved 
until the eighteenth century. The growth of the theory of distribution was running 
over a distinct path. On the other hand, it should be pointed out that the doctrine of 
checks has above all technical significance, and its existence cannot be justified with­
out the theory of division. For in a political system founded on the grounds o f the 
principle o f unity of power a balance of the organs and their checking are out of the 
question. Any executive vetoes, impeachments, or judicial reviews are useless here. In 
addition, the rule o f division of power not being buttressed by the system of checks 
leads either to a paralysis o f the governmental activity or to the domination of some 
organ. Both these precepts are thus o f a complementary nature. For the sake of that 
it is my intention to prefer the logical viewpoint o f this controversy and to treat the 
doctrine of checks as an essential element o f the theory of distribution.
Major complications are also present in the efforts to clarify the meaning of the 
notions that take our interest, and to point at the interdependence occurring between 
them. To exemplify, if K. von Fritz identifies the system of checks with the theory 
of mixed government, M. J. C. Vile is inclined to regard it solely as a variant o f the 
aforesaid theory. For R. C. Moulton, in turn, the theory of balanced government is 
only a reflex o f both the classical theory of mixed government and that o f division 
of power.24 At the same time, definitions of the system of checks which resemble fur­
ther qualifications of the theory of distribution are not lacking, inasmuch as many 
authors identify this theory either with the system referred to before, or with the the­
ory of mixed government. Switching a research plane, if in the opinion of some ana­
lysts this system has appeared as early as in antiquity, the others believe that its birth
24 See S. Pargellis, The Theory of Balanced Government, in: C. Read (ed.), The Constitution Reconsid­
ered, New York-Evanston 1968 (1938), p. 37; C. H. McIlwain, Constitutionalism Ancient and Modern, 
Ithaca, N.Y. 1947, p. 142; K. Loewenstein, The Balance Between Legislative and Executive Power: A Study 
in Comparative Constitutional Law, “The University of Chicago Law Review” 1938, Vol. 5, No. 4, p. 568; 
R. C. Moulton, op.cit., pp. 121, 446, 447; W. B. Gwyn, op.cit., p. 3; K. von Fritz, op.cit., p. 78; M. J. C. Vile, 
op.cit., p. 34. Yet, some explanation require the notions applied in the present study, such as “concept”, 
“doctrine”, “theory”, and “principle”. Most generally, each o f the first three notions denotes a subaltern to 
the specific leading idea, intrinsically systematized and forming a certain whole set of views concerning 
a given problem. In jurisprudence the differences between them reduced only to the degree of exten­
sion of those views: the broadest is theory, narrower is doctrine, and the narrowest is concept. To illus­
trate -  within the theory o f division o f power we meet among others the doctrine of de Montesquieu, 
comprising certain concepts. The term “principle” (rule, maxim, precept), instead, is a certain standard 
of proceeding o f par excellence organizational or functional overtone, being used usually in the norma­
tive context.
ought to be shifted to the seventeenth century. Controversial problems may still be 
recited. At any rate, based upon the ambiguities presented hereinbefore, it is accept­
able to assume that as the genesis o f the theory of division of power takes so dim 
a form in the works o f its commentators, it is hardly possible that it will be more ex­
plicitly visible against the background of the writings o f its precursors.
